The Perfect Crime

Robbers have been known to pistol-whip victims, and they shot and killed a salesman several years ago in San Francisco. Their violence has been getting worse since the early 1980s, when the underworld began evolving its current methods: The original trick was to distract a salesman on a crowded sidewalk by, say, bumping him with a hot dog, leaving a mustard stain. When the salesman put down his case to wipe off the mustard, an accomplice would grab it. After salesmen got wise to this ploy, the crooks started sticking their tires with ice picks, causing slow leaks, then attacking them when the salesmen pulled over. Naturally, the vendors quickly learned to lock their windows and call 911 when they got flats. That forced the robbers to break windows, to instill fear with guns, to follow their targets to suburbia and take them down in their driveways. Every precaution by the victims was met with an escalation of violence by the robbers.

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THE COPS

Thwarted by a New Breed of Criminal

Lt. Bruce Marovitch sits behind his desk in the robbery division at the Hall of Justice. Above him hangs a lithograph depicting moonlight falling on a barren tree, a lifeless stream, an empty house. This is not a place of joy. Marovitch, who teaches cops how to do undercover work, is retiring in a few months. He plans to spend his time reading military novels and writing poetry. He seems a bit embarrassed that San Francisco police are powerless against the SATGs. He explains: "Los Angeles is the mother source of the robbers, who, by the way, are not citizens. The leaders are ex-military and former cops, trained to choreograph the robberies."

It is impossible to predict where the gangs will hit. Government and financial databases hold little or no information on the immigrant crooks, so the cops can't track their movements electronically. Informants are rare. The police have very few effective weapons in their arsenal.

"We send out undercover details looking for them, but you can't do that every day," Marovitch says. "It's boring."

He notes that even when his undercovers, led by Inspector Mark Gamble, spot Hispanic males in the vicinity of jewelry stores, they can't just pull them over. The officers follow the suspects, waiting for them to make a hit. More often than not, however, a second carload of robbers is on the lookout for the undercovers. When the police tails are spotted, the robbers drive away. ("Gamble is good, but the crooks are very good," LAPD Detective Woodings says.)

The cops can stop the robbers for violating traffic laws. When they find a gun in the car, one person will claim it and submit to arrest. Even so, Marovitch says, "these guys don't usually go to jail. They bail out and that's the last we see of them. Unless there is a murder, they normally get bailed."

A few years ago, a jewelers association hired a Washington, D.C., law firm to lobby Congress for some relief from the rash of robberies. In response to political pressure, the FBI set up a small task force, based in L.A. The task force has had limited success: It located several inner-city car rental businesses used by the robbers and arrested a handful of thieves and local fences. But such tactics have done little except drive the crooks onto the freeway system in search of cop-free zones.

Marovitch does not have very high regard for the FBI's task force, which he says ignores San Francisco. "The feds don't know how to do surveillance," Marovitch complains. "We need a RICO [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization] investigation to go to the source. [RICO prosecutions allow government agencies such as the FBI, DEA, INS, and IRS to pool their resources against organized rings of lawbreakers.]

"There are 740 of these bad guys in Los Angeles," Marovitch gripes. "Even if we kill 10 a year, it will take 74 years to wipe them out. We need to set examples. They aren't citizens. Don't let them back into the country after we deport them. Put them in jails without TVs. Give them food, water, keep them clean -- like at Guantánamo Bay.

"We need to treat them like a criminal enterprise. We need wiretaps. The problem is that nobody is pissed off enough at them. It's a business write-off [for the jewelry companies]. They are like a cancer in the country."

The SFPD keeps in touch with Woodings in Los Angeles. "He has a database," Marovitch says.

Woodings, however, laughs when the "database" is mentioned. "We do things the old-fashioned way -- with inventory cards. We would like to be computerized.

"The arrest rate is not high," Woodings admits. He estimates that about 35 suspects a year are caught in L.A., though he does not keep definitive records on numbers of arrests and convictions.

In fact, hard information about the theft groups is difficult to come by anywhere. The FBI claims on its Web site that it established a Jewelry and Gem Major Theft Program in the early 1990s, with "a computerized database, [with] which the FBI collects and analyzes reports of [jewelry] robberies nationwide and disseminates information to federal, state, and local law enforcement." That appears to be more hype than reality.

The agency's spokesman in San Francisco says that "headquarters" maintains the statistics. But a Washington, D.C., spokeswoman says the FBI does not keep statistics on jewelry robbery; she suggested contacting the Jewelers' Security Alliance in New York. The JSA, an industry group, only keeps track of number of robberies and amount stolen; it does not monitor arrests and convictions.